These forces were partly composed of old Venetian
troops, partly of veterans led by Venetian city or country nobles; the
majority of the leaders were, however, princes and rulers of cities or
their relatives. To these forces must be added 24,000 infantry we are
not told how they were raised or commanded with 3,300 additional
troops, who probably belonged to the special services. In time of peace
the cities of the mainland were wholly unprotected or occupied by
insignificant garrisons. Venice relied, if not exactly on the loyalty,
at least on the good sense of its subjects; in the war of the League of
Cambrai (1509) it absolved them, as is well known, from their oath of
allegiance, and let them compare the amenities of a foreign occupation
with the mild government to which they had been accustomed. As there
had been no treason in their desertion of St. Mark, and consequently no
punishment was to be feared, they returned to their old masters with
the utmost eagerness. This war, we may remark parenthetically, was the
result of a century's outcry against the Venetian desire for
aggrandizement. The Venetians, in fact, were not free from the mistake
of those over-clever people who will credit their opponents with no
irrational and inconsiderate conduct. Misled by this optimism, which
is, perhaps, a peculiar weakness of aristocracies, they had utterly
ignored not only the preparations of Mohammed II for the capture of
Constantinople, but even the armaments of Charles VIII, till the
unexpected blow fell at last.
Pages:
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97