The same may be said of a vacuum and atoms, of
heat and cold, of dryness and humidity, and of salt, sulphur, and
mercury, and the other things of this sort which some have adopted
as their principles. But no conclusion deduced from a principle
which is not clear can be evident, even although the deduction be
formally valid; and hence it follows that no reasonings based on
such principles could lead them to the certain knowledge of any one
thing, nor consequently advance them one step in the search after
wisdom. And if they did discover any truth, this was due to one or
other of the four means above mentioned. Notwithstanding this, I am
in no degree desirous to lessen the honour which each of them can
justly claim; I am only constrained to say, for the consolation of
those who have not given their attention to study, that just as in
travelling, when we turn our back upon the place to which we were
going, we recede the farther from it in proportion as we proceed in
the new direction for a greater length of time and with greater
speed, so that, though we may be afterwards brought back to the
right way, we cannot nevertheless arrive at the destined place as
soon as if we had not moved backwards at all; so in philosophy, when
we make use of false principles, we depart the farther from the
knowledge of truth and wisdom exactly in proportion to the care with
which we cultivate them, and apply ourselves to the deduction of
diverse consequences from them, thinking that we are philosophizing
well, while we are only departing the farther from the truth; from
which it must be inferred that they who have learned the least of
all that has been hitherto distinguished by the name of philosophy
are the most fitted for the apprehension of truth.
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