For by regarding them as in
the substances of which they are the modes, we distinguish them from
these substances, and take them for what in truth they are: whereas,
on the other hand, if we wish to consider them apart from the
substances in which they are, we should by this itself regard them
as self-subsisting things, and thus confound the ideas of mode and
substance.
LXV. How we may likewise know their modes.
In the same way we will best apprehend the diverse modes of thought,
as intellection, imagination, recollection, volition, etc., and also
the diverse modes of extension, or those that belong to extension,
as all figures, the situation of parts and their motions, provided
we consider them simply as modes of the things in which they are;
and motion as far as it is concerned, provided we think merely of
locomotion, without seeking to know the force that produces it, and
which nevertheless I will essay to explain in its own place.
LXVI. How our sensations, affections, and appetites may be clearly
known, although we are frequently wrong in our judgments regarding
them.
There remain our sensations, affections, and appetites, of which we
may also have a clear knowledge, if we take care to comprehend in
the judgments we form of them only that which is precisely contained
in our perception of them, and of which we are immediately
conscious.
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