There is, however, great difficulty in observing this, at
least in respect of sensations; because we have all, without
exception, from our youth judged that all the things we perceived by
our senses had an existence beyond our thought, and that they were
entirely similar to the sensations, that is, perceptions, we ad of
them. Thus when, for example, we saw a certain colour, we thought we
saw something occupying a place out of us, and which was entirely
similar to that idea of colour we were then conscious of; and from
the habit of judging in this way, we seemed to see this so clearly
and distinctly that we esteemed it (i.e., the externality of the
colour) certain and indubitable.
LXVII. That we are frequently deceived in our judgments regarding
pain itself.
The same prejudice has place in all our other sensations, even in
those of titillation and pain. For though we are not in the habit of
believing that there exist out of us objects that resemble
titillation and pain, we do not nevertheless consider these
sensations as in the mind alone, or in our perception, but as in the
hand, or foot, or some other part of our body.
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