There is no reason,
however, to constrain us to believe that the pain, for example,
which we feel, as it were, in the foot is something out of the mind
existing in the foot, or that the light which we see, as it were, in
the sun exists in the sun as it is in us. Both these beliefs are
prejudices of our early years, as will clearly appear in the sequel.
LXVIII. How in these things what we clearly conceive is to be
distinguished from that in which we may be deceived.
But that we may distinguish what is clear in our sensations from
what is obscure, we ought most carefully to observe that we possess
a clear and distinct knowledge of pain, colour, and other things of
this sort, when we consider them simply as sensations or thoughts;
but that, when they are judged to be certain things subsisting
beyond our mind, we are wholly unable to form any conception of
them. Indeed, when any one tells us that he sees colour in a body or
feels pain in one of his limbs, this is exactly the same as if he
said that he there saw or felt something of the nature of which he
was entirely ignorant, or that he did not know what he saw or felt.
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