In the first place, then, it cannot be doubted that every
perception we have comes to us from some object different from our
mind; for it is not in our power to cause ourselves to experience
one perception rather than another, the perception being entirely
dependent on the object which affects our senses. It may, indeed, be
matter of inquiry whether that object be God, or something different
from God; but because we perceive, or rather, stimulated by sense,
clearly and distinctly apprehend, certain matter extended in length,
breadth, and thickness, the various parts of which have different
figures and motions, and give rise to the sensation we have of
colours, smells, pain, etc., God would, without question, deserve to
be regarded as a deceiver, if he directly and of himself presented
to our mind the idea of this extended matter, or merely caused it to
be presented to us by some object which possessed neither extension,
figure, nor motion. For we clearly conceive this matter as entirely
distinct from God, and from ourselves, or our mind; and appear even
clearly to discern that the idea of it is formed in us on occasion
of objects existing out of our minds, to which it is in every
respect similar.
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